A report on Consciousness and Qualia

Representation of consciousness from the seventeenth century by Robert Fludd, an English Paracelsian physician
The "redness" of red is a commonly used example of a quale.
John Locke, British Enlightenment philosopher from the 17th century
Inverted qualia
Illustration of dualism by René Descartes. Inputs are passed by the sensory organs to the pineal gland and from there to the immaterial spirit.
Daniel Dennett
Thomas Nagel argues that while a human might be able to imagine what it is like to be a bat by taking "the bat's point of view", it would still be impossible "to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat." (Townsend's big-eared bat pictured).
Marvin Minsky
John Searle in December 2005
Michael Tye
The Necker cube, an ambiguous image
David Chalmers
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran
A Buddhist monk meditating
Neon color spreading effect. The apparent bluish tinge of the white areas inside the circle is an illusion.
Square version of the neon spread illusion

In philosophy of mind, qualia ( or ; singular form: quale) are defined as individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.

- Qualia

Examples of the range of descriptions, definitions or explanations are: simple wakefulness, one's sense of selfhood or soul explored by "looking within"; being a metaphorical "stream" of contents, or being a mental state, mental event or mental process of the brain; having phanera or qualia and subjectivity; being the 'something that it is like' to 'have' or 'be' it; being the "inner theatre" or the executive control system of the mind.

- Consciousness
Representation of consciousness from the seventeenth century by Robert Fludd, an English Paracelsian physician

6 related topics with Alpha

Overall

A phrenological mapping of the brain – phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain although it is now widely discredited.

Philosophy of mind

5 links

Branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind and its relationship with the body.

Branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and nature of the mind and its relationship with the body.

A phrenological mapping of the brain – phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain although it is now widely discredited.
René Descartes' illustration of mind/body dualism.
Portrait of René Descartes by Frans Hals (1648)
Four varieties of dualism. The arrows indicate the direction of the causal interactions. Occasionalism is not shown.
The classic Identity theory and Anomalous Monism in contrast. For the Identity theory, every token instantiation of a single mental type corresponds (as indicated by the arrows) to a physical token of a single physical type. For anomalous monism, the token–token correspondences can fall outside of the type–type correspondences. The result is token identity.
John Searle—one of the most influential philosophers of mind, proponent of biological naturalism (Berkeley 2002)
Since the 1980s, sophisticated neuroimaging procedures, such as fMRI (above), have furnished increasing knowledge about the workings of the human brain, shedding light on ancient philosophical problems.

Aspects of the mind that are studied include mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and its neural correlates, the ontology of the mind, the nature of cognition and of thought, and the relationship of the mind to the body.

Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events "qualia" or "raw feels".

Philosophical zombie

3 links

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person but does not have conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.

René Descartes's illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the epiphysis in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit.

Mind–body dualism

3 links

In the philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism denotes either the view that mental phenomena are non-physical, or that the mind and body are distinct and separable.

In the philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism denotes either the view that mental phenomena are non-physical, or that the mind and body are distinct and separable.

René Descartes's illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the epiphysis in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit.
Four varieties of dualist causal interaction. The arrows indicate the direction of causations. Mental and physical states are shown in red and blue, respectively.
Another one of Descartes' illustrations. The fire displaces the skin, which pulls a tiny thread, which opens a pore in the ventricle (F) allowing the "animal spirit" to flow through a hollow tube, which inflates the muscle of the leg, causing the foot to withdraw.
Cartesian dualism compared to three forms of monism.

Descartes clearly identified the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and distinguished this from the brain as the seat of intelligence.

Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia. There is something that it's like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on.

280x280px

Hard problem of consciousness

2 links

280x280px

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how humans have qualia or phenomenal experiences.

Nagel in 1978

Thomas Nagel

2 links

American philosopher.

American philosopher.

Nagel in 1978
Nagel in 2008, teaching ethics

He continued the critique of reductionism in Mind and Cosmos (2012), in which he argues against the neo-Darwinian view of the emergence of consciousness.

Nagel is probably most widely known in philosophy of mind as an advocate of the idea that consciousness and subjective experience cannot, at least with the contemporary understanding of physicalism, be satisfactorily explained with the concepts of physics.

Silver didrachma from Crete depicting Talos, an ancient mythical automaton with artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence

1 links

Intelligence demonstrated by machines, as opposed to the natural intelligence displayed by animals including humans.

Intelligence demonstrated by machines, as opposed to the natural intelligence displayed by animals including humans.

Silver didrachma from Crete depicting Talos, an ancient mythical automaton with artificial intelligence
An ontology represents knowledge as a set of concepts within a domain and the relationships between those concepts.
A parse tree represents the syntactic structure of a sentence according to some formal grammar.
Feature detection (pictured: edge detection) helps AI compose informative abstract structures out of raw data.
Kismet, a robot with rudimentary social skills
A particle swarm seeking the global minimum
Expectation-maximization clustering of Old Faithful eruption data starts from a random guess but then successfully converges on an accurate clustering of the two physically distinct modes of eruption.
A neural network is an interconnected group of nodes, akin to the vast network of neurons in the human brain.
Representing images on multiple layers of abstraction in deep learning
For this project the AI had to learn the typical patterns in the colors and brushstrokes of Renaissance painter Raphael. The portrait shows the face of the actress Ornella Muti, "painted" by AI in the style of Raphael.
AI Patent families for functional application categories and sub categories. Computer vision represents 49 percent of patent families related to a functional application in 2016.
The word "robot" itself was coined by Karel Čapek in his 1921 play R.U.R., the title standing for "Rossum's Universal Robots"

The only thing visible is the behavior of the machine, so it does not matter if the machine is conscious, or has a mind, or whether the intelligence is merely a "simulation" and not "the real thing".

Human information processing is easy to explain, however, human subjective experience is difficult to explain.