Parag Pathak

Parag A. PathakPathak
Parag A. Pathak (born c. 1980) is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research where he co-founded and directs the working group on market design.wikipedia
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Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers

PECASEPresidential Early Career Awards for Scientists and EngineersPresidential Early Career Award
Pathak is an Alfred P. Sloan Fellow and a recipient of a 2012 Presidential Early Career for Scientists and Engineers by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans

Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowship for New AmericansPaul and Daisy Soros Fellowship for New AmericansPaul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans
Pathak was educated at Harvard University where he received a Bachelor's and master's degrees in Applied Mathematics (summa cum laude) and PhD in Business Economics in 2007 with the support of The Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans.

Alvin E. Roth

Alvin RothAl RothRoth, A. E.
A protege of 2012 Nobel Prize winner Alvin E. Roth, Pathak is best known for his work in market design.
Roth and his colleagues Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Parag Pathak proposed David Gale and Lloyd Shapley's incentive-compatible student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the school board in 2003.

Tayfun Sönmez

Tayfun Sonmez
Around the same time, he worked together with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez to design a new student assignment system for Boston Public Schools, which was adopted in 2005.
Working together with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, the team of economists identified parents in Boston who developed heuristics on how to play this real-world game so that their children would not be unassigned, leaving those unaware of these features disadvantaged.

John Bates Clark Medal

Clark MedalJohn Bates Clark Award6 John Bates Clark Medals
In 2018 he was awarded the John Bates Clark Medal, for his work that "blends institutional knowledge, theoretical sophistication, and careful empirical analysis to provide insights that are of immediate value to important public-policy issues.”

Joshua Angrist

AngristJoshua D. Angrist
Work with Joshua Angrist finds that charter schools outside of urban areas are not particularly effective.
He is a frequent co-author of Guido Imbens, Alan B. Krueger, Victor Lavy, Parag Pathak and Jorn-Steffen Pischke.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MITM.I.T.Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Parag A. Pathak (born c. 1980) is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research where he co-founded and directs the working group on market design.

National Bureau of Economic Research

NBERThe National Bureau of Economic ResearchInnovation Policy and the Economy
Parag A. Pathak (born c. 1980) is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research where he co-founded and directs the working group on market design.

Mechanism design

mechanismmechanism design theoryMyerson ironing
Parag A. Pathak (born c. 1980) is Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research where he co-founded and directs the working group on market design.

Business economics

business economistbusinessbusiness and economics
Pathak was educated at Harvard University where he received a Bachelor's and master's degrees in Applied Mathematics (summa cum laude) and PhD in Business Economics in 2007 with the support of The Paul & Daisy Soros Fellowships for New Americans.

Jean Tirole

Tirole, J.Tirole, JeanTirole
From 2002-2003, Pathak served as a visiting fellow at the University of Toulouse where he studied under Jean Tirole, the 2014 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences

Nobel Prize in EconomicsNobel PrizeEconomics
From 2002-2003, Pathak served as a visiting fellow at the University of Toulouse where he studied under Jean Tirole, the 2014 winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Harvard Society of Fellows

Junior FellowSociety of FellowsHarvard Junior Fellow
Pathak served as a Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows.

Sloan Research Fellowship

Sloan FellowshipSloan Research FellowAlfred P. Sloan Fellowship
Pathak is an Alfred P. Sloan Fellow and a recipient of a 2012 Presidential Early Career for Scientists and Engineers by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Lloyd Shapley

Lloyd S. ShapleyShapleyShapley, Lloyd
In 2012, he was selected to give the Shapley Lecture, a lecture in honor of Lloyd Shapley given by a distinguished game theorist aged 40 or under at the 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society.

Market design

auction theoryMarket (Mechanism) Design Theorymarket design in matching theory
A protege of 2012 Nobel Prize winner Alvin E. Roth, Pathak is best known for his work in market design.

Microeconomics

microeconomicmicroeconomic theoryprice theory
He is a leader in the recent push to apply engineering methods to microeconomics.

New York City Department of Education

New York City Public SchoolsNYC Department of EducationNew York City public school system
As a graduate student, Pathak worked with Roth to design the algorithm underlying the system used to match New York City public school students to high schools as incoming freshman.

Boston Public Schools

Boston School CommitteeBoston Public School systemBoston Public School
Around the same time, he worked together with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez to design a new student assignment system for Boston Public Schools, which was adopted in 2005.

Top trading cycle

top trading cyclesTop Trading Cycles and Chains
Boston held citywide discussions and hearings on the school selection system and finally in 2005 narrowed the choice to one of two mechanisms: the top trading cycles mechanism for schools and the student-optimal stable mechanism based on the stable marriage problem.

Stable marriage problem

stable matchingstable marriagestable matching problem
Boston held citywide discussions and hearings on the school selection system and finally in 2005 narrowed the choice to one of two mechanisms: the top trading cycles mechanism for schools and the student-optimal stable mechanism based on the stable marriage problem.

Incentive compatibility

incentive compatibleincentive-compatiblean incentive to bid their true valuations
The policy change was the first time an incentive compatible strategyproof mechanism, based on an abstract concept from mechanism design, played a role in a public policy discussion.

Strategyproofness

truthful mechanismstrategyproofstrategy-proof
The policy change was the first time an incentive compatible strategyproof mechanism, based on an abstract concept from mechanism design, played a role in a public policy discussion.