Restatement of Policy on Germany

Stuttgart Speechannouncesduring a speech 6 September 1946speech
"Restatement of Policy on Germany" is a speech given by James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.wikipedia
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Stuttgart

Stuttgart, GermanyStuttgart, West GermanyVaihingen
"Restatement of Policy on Germany" is a speech given by James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.
An early concept of the Marshall Plan aimed at supporting reconstruction and economic/political recovery across Europe was presented during a speech 6 September 1946 given by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes at the Stuttgart Opera House.

Lucius D. Clay

Lucius ClayClayGeneral Clay
General Lucius Clay stated, "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand".
The speech, "Restatement of Policy on Germany", marked the formal transition in American occupation policy away from the Morgenthau Plan of economic dismantlement to one of economic reconstruction.

Morgenthau Plan

JCS 1067Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067harsh peace for the German people
Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future US policy, as it repudiated the economic policies of the Morgenthau Plan and, with its message of a change to a policy of economic reconstruction, gave the Germans hope for the future. The Western powers' worst fear by now was that the poverty and hunger envisioned by the Morgenthau Plan would drive the Germans to Communism.
The change was heralded by Restatement of Policy on Germany, a famous speech by James F. Byrnes, then United States Secretary of State, held in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.

James F. Byrnes

James ByrnesJames Francis ByrnesByrnes
"Restatement of Policy on Germany" is a speech given by James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.
The "Restatement of Policy on Germany", also known as the "Speech of Hope", set the tone of future U.S. policy as it repudiated the Morgenthau Plan, an economic program that would permanently deindustrialize Germany.

Saarland

SaarSaar regionSaar area
A stated exception to US support for self-determination was the support given in the speech to the French claim to the Saarland.
In his speech "Restatement of Policy on Germany", made in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes stated the U.S. motive in detaching the Saar from Germany: "The United States does not feel that it can deny to France, which has been invaded three times by Germany in 70 years, its claim to the Saar territory".

Oder–Neisse line

Oder-Neisse lineOder-Neiße linefrontier changes
Byrnes, who accepted Western Neisse as the provisional Polish border, also addressed the Polish and Soviet claims to all German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, an area comprising roughly 25% of pre-war (1937) Germany.
government regarding the Oder–Neisse line in his Stuttgart Speech of 6 September 1946:

United States Secretary of State

Secretary of StateU.S. Secretary of StateUS Secretary of State
"Restatement of Policy on Germany" is a speech given by James F. Byrnes, the United States Secretary of State, in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946.

Economic reconstruction

reconstructionoperationalreconstructions
Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future US policy, as it repudiated the economic policies of the Morgenthau Plan and, with its message of a change to a policy of economic reconstruction, gave the Germans hope for the future.

Germany

GermanGERFederal Republic of Germany
Also known as the "Speech of hope" it set the tone of future US policy, as it repudiated the economic policies of the Morgenthau Plan and, with its message of a change to a policy of economic reconstruction, gave the Germans hope for the future.

Communism

communistcommunistscommunist ideology
The Western powers' worst fear by now was that the poverty and hunger envisioned by the Morgenthau Plan would drive the Germans to Communism.

Soviet Union

SovietUSSRSoviets
Byrnes, who accepted Western Neisse as the provisional Polish border, also addressed the Polish and Soviet claims to all German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, an area comprising roughly 25% of pre-war (1937) Germany. The speech was also seen as a first firm stand against the Soviet Union as it stated the intention of the United States to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely.

United States

AmericanU.S.USA
The speech was also seen as a first firm stand against the Soviet Union as it stated the intention of the United States to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely.

Europe

EuropeanEUEuropean continent
The speech was also seen as a first firm stand against the Soviet Union as it stated the intention of the United States to maintain a military presence in Europe indefinitely.

Ruhr

Ruhr areaRuhrgebietRuhr region
On the question of territorial integrity of Germany it was stated that "the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware the people of the Ruhr area and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States is not going to oppose their desire."

Rhineland

RhenishRheinlandThe Rhineland
On the question of territorial integrity of Germany it was stated that "the United States will not support any encroachment on territory which is indisputably German or any division of Germany which is not genuinely desired by the people concerned. So far as the United States is aware the people of the Ruhr area and the Rhineland desire to remain united with the rest of Germany. And the United States is not going to oppose their desire."

Poland

PolishPOLRepublic of Poland
Byrnes, who accepted Western Neisse as the provisional Polish border, also addressed the Polish and Soviet claims to all German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, an area comprising roughly 25% of pre-war (1937) Germany.

Curzon Line

boundary between Poland and the Soviet UnionCurzonPoland's eastern border with Russia
In his speech, he left the final extent of the area east of the Oder Neisse that would become permanently Polish to be decided in the future, stating, "The Soviets and the Poles suffered greatly at the hands of Hitler's invading armies. As a result of the agreement at Yalta, Poland ceded to the Soviet Union territory east of the Curzon Line. Because of this, Poland asked for revision of her northern and western frontiers. The United States will support revision of these frontiers in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon."

Propaganda

propagandistpropagandisticpropagandists
The purpose of the speech and associated US diplomatic activities was as propaganda aimed at Germany by the Western Powers, who could then blame Polish-German border and German expulsions on Moscow alone.

Potsdam Conference

Potsdamin 1945Potsdam negotiations
The territory had been handed over to Polish and Soviet administration at the Potsdam conference, the border was to be determined at the peace conference (which did not take place until 1990, and ratified what had been in place since 1945), but with the area experiencing the flight and expulsion of Germans in 1944–50 it in the de facto became Polish and Soviet territory.

Flight and expulsion of Germans (1944–1950)

expelledexpulsion of Germans after World War IIexpulsion of Germans
The territory had been handed over to Polish and Soviet administration at the Potsdam conference, the border was to be determined at the peace conference (which did not take place until 1990, and ratified what had been in place since 1945), but with the area experiencing the flight and expulsion of Germans in 1944–50 it in the de facto became Polish and Soviet territory.

Władysław Gomułka

Wladyslaw GomulkaGomułkaGomulka
In a speech, Władysław Gomułka condemned Byrne's speech and its implication of a border revision in favor of Germany as reactionary.

Wojciech Jaruzelski

JaruzelskiGeneral JaruzelskiPolish General and President Wojciech Witold Jaruzelski
Many years later, Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski would reflect on the implications of the speech:

Arthur Bliss Lane

Ambassador Arthur Bliss LaneArthur Lane
Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane reassured Byrne's speech should not be interpreted as US's desire to avoid its obligations made at Potsdam.